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Abstract: 
Spatiotemporal modelling of infectious diseases such as COVID-19 involves using a variety of 
epidemiological metrics such as regional proportion of cases or regional positivity rates. 
Although observing their changes over time is critical to estimate the regional disease burden, 
the dynamical properties of these measures as well as cross-relationships are not systematically 
explained. Here we provide a spatiotemporal framework composed of six commonly used and 
newly constructed epidemiological metrics and conduct a case study evaluation. We introduce 
a refined risk model that is biased neither by the differences in population sizes nor by the 
spatial heterogeneity of testing. In particular, the proposed methodology is useful for the 
unbiased identification of time periods with elevated COVID-19 risk, without sensitivity to 
spatial heterogeneity of neither population nor testing. Our results also provide insights 
regarding regional prioritization of testing and the consequences of potential synchronization 
of epidemics between regions.  
 
One Sentence Summary: Refined model of relative risk by incorporating testing data better 
identifies spatiotemporal changes in COVID-19. 
  
Introduction 
COVID-19 disease is caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 which was first discovered 
in late 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. The main signs of infection include respiratory 
symptoms, fever, cough and breathing difficulties 1. Spatiotemporal analysis plays a critical 
role in estimating the disease burden in specific regions 2, and it has been studied in many 
countries, including China 3,4, Spain 5, Italy 6,7, Israel 8, Brazil 9 and United States 10,11. It is 
important to note that comparisons between regions may be challenging, and this is not only 
because of differences in population sizes but also differences in health policies (e.g. testing 
regimes) that can change over time 10. Indeed, one of the most common limitations raised when 
using spatiotemporal approaches relates to the lack of incorporation of the spatial heterogeneity 
of testing 12–14. This omission may be misleading to public health officials in terms of an 
adequate public health response in regions with relatively high or low testing capabilities. From 
among many measures applicable in the spatiotemporal modelling of the COVID-19 disease, 
the following attracted the greatest attention: local 6 and global 15 cumulative number of cases, 
different versions of population-based relative risk (observed cases/expected cases) 13,16, testing 
rates (tests/population) 17, local 17 and global 15 positivity rates (confirmed cases/tests) 17,18 and 
population-based positivity (confirmed cases/population) 14,18. Although potentially useful, the 
above measures were not investigated for their suitability in dynamical modelling of infectious 
disease. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, their dynamical properties and cross-
relationships were not systematically explained. However, this has crucial importance for 
guiding the public health response: for example, it may be decided that an uninterrupted 
increase in cumulative version of population-based relative risk 13 entails the introduction of 
specific non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) 19 in specific regions. Moreover, from the 
definition of these measures it follows that all of them are sensitive to spatial heterogeneity of 
either population or testing or both in their identification of elevated COVID-19, leading to 
bias. 
This study is intended to offer a systematic contribution regarding a variety of spatiotemporal 
epidemiological measures independently used in both comparative 13,17,18 and non-comparative 
15 contexts. We reveal dynamical properties and prove relationships between the commonly 
used and newly constructed epidemiological metrics with a case study application. The 
proposed methodology has the potential to enhance the framework of infectious disease 
modelling and provides insights into how a more harmonized management of the crisis can be 
achieved. 
Simultaneous standardisation with respect to population and testing 
The notion of relative risk is often used to investigate the spatial distribution of cases 16,20,21 and 
is inherently related to the concept of indirect standardisation 21. It involves calculating the 
standardised incidence ratio (SIR) which accounts for the differences in population sizes among 
regions. Typically, this value depends on individual daily infection rates and is calculated as 
the ratio between the observed number of cases (infections) in a region and the expected number 
of cases based on the regional population. Values greater than one suggest an elevated risk 
compared to the population average which may indicate infection clusters or a greater number 
of vulnerable groups 16. To alleviate the impact of daily fluctuations and create a framework for 
comparing the present state with historical reference, a cumulative model can be applied 13, 
which we refer to as the cumulative standardised incidence ratio (CSIR). It is calculated for a 
specific day 𝑡 as the ratio of the confirmed number of cases since the outbreak of the pandemic, 
including day 𝑡, to the expected cumulative number of cases on day 𝑡. We mathematically show 
that from a dynamical viewpoint it is equivalent to the regional cumulative proportion of cases; 
that is, for a specific day 𝑡 and region 𝑖, it may decrease or increase depending on whether the 
proportion of cases for 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is lower or greater than the cumulative proportion for 𝑖 on 
day 𝑡 − 1. The limitation of using this risk estimate to compare regions is that it is only unbiased 
if there is spatial homogeneity regarding testing intensity. To overcome this problem, we first 
applied an analogous procedure for the data related to regional testing. Namely, we calculated 
a quantity that we refer to as the cumulative standardised testability ratio (CSTR). It is 
calculated as the proportion of observed tests to expected tests in a given region. It is important 
to note that the resulting value can be interpreted as an estimate of the relative safety. This is 
because the greater the quantity is, the more efficiently NPIs can be applied. We then divided 
the CSIR by the CSTR to get a refined estimate of the relative risk, which we call the weighted 
cumulative standardized incidence ratio (WCSIR). It follows that the WCSIR remains 
unchanged from the CSIR only if the CSTR is equal to one, that is, the number of tests is equal 
to the expected number of tests. Otherwise, the relative risk increases or decreases depending 
on whether the CSTR is smaller than or greater than one, respectively. The resulting risk 
estimate is therefore biased neither by differences in population sizes nor by differences in 
amount of testing in specific regions. In other words, the WCSIR measure allows testing 
intensity to be heterogeneous and we mathematically prove that it captures the change in 
relative risk by honouring the following expectations: 
1) For a specific region, a risk measure should decrease if the regional infection rate 
(regional infected/global infected) decreases and the analogous test rate (regional 
tests/global tests) increases.  
2)  For a specific region, a risk measure should decrease if the cumulative global 
positivity rate (GPR) (cumulative positive/cumulative tests) increases, while the 
analogous local positivity rate (LPR) decreases.  
As such, we anticipate our study to be a starting point for considering more sophisticated models 
of relative risk. For example, even if the dynamics of the regional proportion of cases show a 
positive trend for a given region, our methodology can classify this region as one with 
decreasing risk if the local and global positivity ratios are in opposite directions (i.e. are 
decreasing and increasing respectively). 
Case study motivation 
On March 4th, 2020, the first confirmed case was registered in Poland 22. Four days later, cases 
were identified in the densely populated Silesian region 23. As of August 17, 2020, 57,286 cases 
were verified in Poland, with 18,874 cases (34.8%) attributed to the Silesian region 24. The core 
of the Silesian region is referred to as the Katowice conurbation, a polycentric area consisting 
of 16 towns and approximately 2 million people with a population density of 1,485 per km2 
(24). The largest urban centre is Katowice with 280 thousand inhabitants 25. The concentration 
of public health efforts in Silesia follows from its large proportion of the population employed 
in industry (28.7%), compared to the mean-country value of 20.6%. Of those employed in 
industry in the area, 16.7% are employed in mining and exploration, which is also the largest 
value in Poland (mean-country value of 4.6 %) 26. 
After the first case in Poland was identified, NPIs were introduced, including cancelling mass 
events and closing borders, schools, and universities among other measures 27,28. These 
interventions helped flatten the curve of total infected individuals and delayed the peak of the 
disease burden (Fig. 1). However, the lockdown measures applied were ultimately insufficient 
in terms of containing the spread of the disease in the densely populated and relatively 
industrially oriented Silesian region. Because it is difficult to apply social distancing 
recommendations 1 in crowded mine shafts, it is hypothesized that the spread of COVID-19 in 
the Silesian region was facilitated by miners who might have acted as asymptomatic carriers. 
This has critical importance as it has been demonstrated that asymptomatic carriers play a vital 
role in the spread of the novel coronavirus 29 and undocumented infectious cases can facilitate 
rapid dissemination 30. Indeed, according to partial results related to 50,053 screening tests 
within a group of mines conducted between May 7, 2020 and June 25, 2020 as a proxy for the 
whole mining population, nearly 98 percent of the infected mine employees did not indicate 
any symptoms 31,32. As of August 11, 7,934 miners were tested positive for COVID-19 which 
yields nearly 44% of infections in Silesian region 33. Although the time period related to 
screening tests in mines resulted in greater population-based relative risk for Silesia, two major 
problems remain: 1) whether the decision on screening tests was a result of an already 
deteriorating epidemiological situation in Silesia – with the beginning of this deterioration being 
unknown and 2) whether in other regions with relatively low testing capabilities the risk related 
to COVID-19 disease exists but is undetected. 
We evaluated the proposed methodology on infection and testing rates that were provided by 
Ministry of Health in Poland: between March 4 and August 17 (infections) as well as between 
May 11 and August 17 (tests). The data were provided for 16 administrative regions of Poland 
(abbreviations presented in Supplementary Fig. 1) that span the area of 312,696 km2. Because 
the official testing rates were published on a weekly basis, to estimate the testing rates for 
individual days, we used interpolation. Other official reports supplemented by reports from 
news sources (as of March 26) were also used to perform interpolation for individual days 
between March 26 and May 11. Complete details regarding interpolation are available in the 
Methods. 
  
Results 
Unweighted risk 
The SIR analysis reveals that in the Silesian region (12 KAT) the relative risk values were 
largely greater than one since mid-April and on five days in late April and early May this value 
was greater than 3, all before the decision to screen for COVID-19 in mines (Fig. 2A). In the 
28 days after implementation of this testing policy, SIR values were always greater than 3, with 
maximum value 6.92 on May 12th and fluctuations between 4 and 6. However, greater than 
expected number of cases since mid-April suggest that the outbreak might have originated 
earlier than the decision to test miners. Indeed, CSIR curves show a rising trend prior to the 
decision to implement screening tests in mines in Silesia largely after the Easter holiday (Fig. 
2B). The nearly monotonously rising trajectory of both CSIR between mid-April and mid-June 
denotes the progressive relative deterioration of the epidemiological situation in Silesia for this 
time period.  
Weighted risk 
However, as discussed above, the estimates of relative risks presented in Fig. 2 are biased by 
the regional differences in testing intensity. Figure 3 shows that throughout the epidemic the 
highest testing intensity was observed for the Warszawa region (7 WAR), with lowest positions 
occupied by the Opole (8 OPO) and Rzeszów (9 RZE) regions.  
According to the WCSIR model (Fig. 4; Fig. 5 – lowest part) the Opole region (8 OPO) was 
the least safe region during the height of the epidemic in Poland (11 April-18 May), and at the 
end of the study period occupies second position, with a significant distance to the third ranked 
Rzeszów region (9 RZE). Although positive differences between CSIR and WCSIR for both 
Silesia (12 KAT) and Opole (8 OPO) can be observed (Figs. 4, 5), for the Silesia region this 
difference is smaller and the corresponding curves are more or less parallel (Fig. 4). This is not 
the case for the Opole region, whose CSIR and WCSIR curves show a greater difference and a 
diverging pattern in mid-May: while the WCSIR was increasing during May 13-18 with a 
simultaneous decrease in CSTR, an increase in CSIR was observed only between May 15-17. 
This means that the weighted risk estimate may increase even if the unweighted risk decreases.  
Dynamical patterns 
A more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between cumulative measures (CSTR, 
CSIR, WCSIR and the LPR-GPR tandem (Fig. 6)) can be conducted by plotting daily values of 
two selected measures on a Cartesian plane (Figs. 7-10, Supplementary Figs. 2-4). In summary 
of all sixteen regions, we highlighted six potentially distinct trajectories that emerged. Fig. 7A 
shows the ideal situation when CSIR and WCSIR decrease together throughout the period, as 
exemplified by the Wrocław region (1 WRO). This pattern can be summarised that although 
sometimes CSTR is increasing, the CSIR is decreasing (Fig. 8A). The second pattern for 
Warszawa (7 WAR) region shows that the decreasing value of CSIR is associated with an 
increasing value of WCSIR and LPR (Figs. 7B, 9B). The trajectory of the Opole region (8 OPO) 
region represents the third pattern: while the CSIR was approximately constant, the WCSIR 
was rising fast (Fig. 7C), confirming the divergent pattern in mid-May observed in Figure 4. 
We note however that the LPR and WCSIR show a decreasing trend since June (Figs. 7C, 9C) 
in Opole region. Figure 7D shows the fourth pattern with an undesireable change of the 
trajectory of the relationship, as typified by the Rzeszów region (9 RZE) since mid-June. For 
Silesia (12 KAT) (Fig. 7E) we observe the fifth pattern of a plateau in the relationship after 
initial growth of CSIR and WCSIR. This may be due to largely decreasing LPR since June 
when it reached a maximum value of 10.25% (Fig. 6). The last pattern, exemplified by the 
Poznań (15 POZ) region (Figs. 8F, Supplementary Figs. 2-3F), shows a change in direction of 
CSTR trajectory that started to decrease in mid-June. Although at the beginning of this change 
LPR was still decreasing, within a month from this change it started to increase (Supplementary 
Fig. 4F) with undulating CSIR and WCSIR (Figs. 7F, 8F).  
  
Discussion 
In this article, we highlighted the properties and relationships between commonly used and 
newly constructed epidemiological measures applicable in spatiotemporal infectious disease 
relative risk modelling. We stressed the role of including information on testing intensity in 
estimating the relative risks of COVID-19 infection, with a case study in Poland. The weighted 
approach is particularly useful when spatial homogeneity in testing intensity cannot be 
assumed, which was the case in our example. For instance, as of August 17, the Warszawa 
region was tested nearly 4.5 times more intensely (CSTR=1.66) than the Rzeszów region 
(CSTR=0.37). Given these disproportions, inferring the epidemic dynamics from the confirmed 
number of cases is not justified 34. We also show the official statements regarding the Silesia 
region as the most tested (CSTR never greater than 1, as of August 17) 35, the epidemiologically 
safest region 36, or epidemiologically unexceptional (both CSIR and WCSIR>1) 37 to be false.  
The refined results could be utilized by authorities and health crisis managers to introduce more 
integrated NPI policies for adjacent regions that can be epidemiologically synchronized 38,39. In 
our case, the similarity between WCSIR values and relatively high positivity rates throughout 
the study period suggest that this synchronization may be the case for the Opole and Silesia 
regions. As of now in these regions, differences in organising public gatherings remain: for 
example in the Opole region, church authorities allowed the organisation of city-wide 
processions at the Feast of Corpus Christi (June 11) 40, whereas in Silesia mass gatherings of 
this kind were forbidden 41. Because public gatherings played a vital role in the spread of the 
1918 influenza pandemic 19,42, it is now necessary to stress the significance of the joint effect 
of testing and infection rates to prevent downplaying the epidemiological risk in poorly tested 
regions. 
We moreover illustrated that incorporating the historical data for calculating the relative risk 
can be beneficial to better identify time periods related to investigated trends. Using a 
cumulative model of relative risk, we demonstrate that systematic growth in infections already 
started in mid-April, three weeks before the decision to implement screening tests in mines in 
Silesia. This is particularly concerning as the lack of screening tests at the time of potentially 
greater, yet unknown, mobility corresponding to Easter may have facilitated the local spread of 
the disease among these mostly asymptomatic and thus undetected carriers. We note however 
that the epidemiological deterioration did not affect all mines equally and it was highly variable 
throughout the study period: while at the end of June the positivity ratio calculated for a group 
of several mines did not exceed 4% (1,862 confirmed cases/50,053 tests) 32, one month later a 
screening test conducted for one mine from this group revealed about 35% population-based 
positivity (156 confirmed cases/452 employees) 43. Surprisingly, the systematic deterioration 
and highest positivity ratio in May for Silesia coincides with a temporal concentration of 
increase in one particular mine in which the population-based positivity increased from about 
5% (245/4,982 employees, as of May 14) to 28% (as of May 24), to 33% (as of July 29).  
The investigation of COVID-19 spread in similar conditions was already carried out in the 
densely populated region of Buenos Aires with 13 million inhabitants in 41 districts 44. This 
research was based on analysing anonymized mobile phones and it revealed that the spread of 
the disease was radial in nature: from the central city of Buenos Aires, through the suburban 
districts, to the neighbouring regions. There are however two major differences underlying the 
spread of the disease in Buenos Aires versus the Silesian region. While the first difference is 
related to a very specific spatial structure of the Silesian region, the second points at the greater 
role of industry rather than population density in the spread of the disease. Other studies have 
likewise shown that population density 14,45, age structure 14, and socioeconomic status 10,18,46 
among other variables affect COVID-19 transmission patterns, but this study adds knowledge 
regarding how the area’s relative dominance in an economic sector can play a role in the 
transmission. We note however that the mining industry should be only regarded as a proxy of 
the infectious potential of large industrial plants and indeed similar events were registered in 
other regions (e.g. in 15 POZ region in meat-processing company in early August – 313 
confirmed cases/800 employees) 47. Given these plants may attract employees from more 
distant localities, they have the potential to synchronize the epidemics at the sub-regional level, 
sometimes trespassing the administrative borders of a higher level 39. Therefore, particular 
attention should be paid if this synchronization may be the case for administrative regions with 
different testing capabilities. 
The main limitation of this study follows from the incompleteness of official data related to 
testing data that are publicly available only since May 11th (see details in Methods). For the 
time period between March 26 and May 11, the results of weighting approaches and positivity 
ratios are estimated with greater uncertainty and we urge more caution in interpreting estimates 
at the beginning of the time period. The confirmed yet unexplained underreporting for Silesia 
resulting in about an 8% (as of July 9) underestimate of cases as well as limited reliability of 
testing data for Kielce region 48 poses additional interpretation difficulties 49. An additional 
limitation is that there may be other unknown differences in testing regimes influencing the 
results. For example, poorly tested regions may decide that only very suspicious cases will be 
tested which will result in a relatively high positivity ratio 15. We also did not include 
information on recovered individuals, defined as those with two subsequent negative tests 50 
which underestimates the positivity ratios for the time period in which the number of recovered 
increases. It should also be stressed that the theorem regarding the dynamics of WCSIR has the 
form of an implication, so one is not allowed to establish a causal relationship between a 
decrease of WCSIR and either of the alternatives in the implication given. 
Because testing capabilities are always limited, the obtained results after weighting could also 
be used to consider regional prioritization in the availability of tests. For example, from Table 
1 it could be inferred that the following regions are in particular need for increasing the intensity 
of testing: Opole (8 OPO:  + 170.53%) and Rzeszów (9 RZE: + 171.41%). A more meaningful 
analysis of testing capabilities should however always involve the temporal aspect (Fig. 3) and 
the relationship between the epidemiological indices that we proposed and developed 
throughout time (Figs. 7-10, Supplementary Figs. 2-4). Therefore, we support calls for the 
radical increase in the identification of positive cases and accompanying isolation as well as 
encourage behavioural changes and increase awareness of the disease to help reduce the spread 
of COVID-19 30,51. We also believe that this method holds promise to guide efforts in countries 
without a robust health care infrastructure and to counter a misinterpretation of the perception 
of a high relative risk in densely tested areas compared to areas with low apparent relative risk 
due to limited testing availability, when in fact a high risk of COVID-19 may simply be 
undetected. 
  
Methods 
 
Materials 
We collected daily data on infections in Poland starting March 4, 2020 until August 17, 2020 
from the Ministry of Health in Poland. From a technical viewpoint, the data are stored in a data 
frame in which columns represent days, while rows are administrative regions. A limitation of 
using this data is that reporting inaccuracies were not always adequately described. Although 
we applied 18 corrections, sometimes the dates corresponding to false positive cases or detected 
duplicates of confirmed cases were not provided. The inaccuracies and the corresponding 
metadata including dates of errors and applied corrections are summarised in Supplementary 
Table 1.  
The data on regional testing are available for the time period between March 26, 2020 and 
August 17, 2020. The reports from May 11, 2020 onward were provided by the Ministry of 
Health in Poland on a weekly basis in the form of cumulative number of tests conducted for 
every region. It should be noted, however, that these cumulative data do not include the full day 
of publishing but are restricted to a specific hour of the day. For example, cumulative regional 
data on testing published on August 17 cover the time period between March 4 and August 17, 
1:00 p.m. We also used official fragmentary reports as well as an unofficial incomplete report 
for March 26, 2020 from a news source (Supplementary Table 2). For days preceding March 
26, 2020 no data on regional testing are publicly available, therefore we excluded this period 
from the analysis. There is concern about limited reliability of testing data for Kielce region for 
which about 241 000 tests were erroneously registered 52. Although the correction was applied 
on August 8 52, the historical data were not officially corrected. We therefore subtracted the 
superfluous number of tests evenly throughout the time period for the Kielce region. Population 
census data were obtained from the official repository Demographic Yearbook of Poland 53. 
Methodology 
Estimating relative risk 
To estimate the relative risk in regions of interest we used the concept of indirect 
standardisation 20,21. The general formula for estimating the relative risk can be written as 
follows: 
𝑂
𝐸
, where 𝑂 and 𝐸 denote the observed and the expected number of cases respectively. 
Given a specific region 𝑖, to obtain 𝐸𝑖 it is first necessary to calculate a global ratio 𝑟 =
∑ 𝑂𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
, 
where ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖  denotes the total population. It is then straightforward to calculate 𝐸𝑖 as 𝑃𝑖𝑟, with 
𝑃𝑖 being the population in region 𝑖. For example, if the proportion of cases in Poland is 2%, 
then the expected number of cases in Silesia would be 2% of the population of Silesia, which 
assumes a spatially homogenous distribution of cases 20. We must now differentiate between 
two versions of calculating the relative risks in our study: Standardised Incidence Ratio (SIR), 
Cumulative Standardised Incidence Ratio (CSIR) and Weighted Cumulative Standardised 
Incidence Ratio (WCSIR) based on Cumulative Standardised Testability Ratio (CSTR).  
For the SIR, the totals of observed number of cases and the expected number of cases 𝐸𝑖 refer 
to the daily number of cases. If we denote 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 as the observed number of cases on day 𝑡, and 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 as the expected number of cases on day 𝑡, we can write the following formula: 
𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)  =
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡
=
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
    (1) 
For the CSIR, we assume that, for a specific day 𝑡, the observed number of cases in region 𝑖 is 
the sum of the observed number of cases in 𝑖 for days 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑡]. Similarly, to calculate the 
corresponding ratio we assume that the observed number of cases is the sum of all cases that 
were confirmed in Poland for days 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑡]. Then, the ratio is multiplied by the population size 
in 𝑖 to get the expected number of cases. The CSIR is then calculated as the proportion between 
the observed and expected number of cases. If we denote 𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗=1  as the cumulative 
number of cases for region 𝑖 up to day 𝑡 − 1, and 𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡 as the expected cumulative number of 
cases for 𝑖 on day 𝑡, then the formula for CSIR can be written as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
=  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖
∑ (𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡)𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
   (2) 
From this it follows that the current value of CSIR is to a large extent governed by the past 
(cumulative cases from days 1 up to 𝑡 − 1) and the contribution of present day 𝑡 weakens with 
time. This explains why the curves are smooth: the present has a smaller effect than the past. 
To sum up, the past contributes primarily to the present state and, with time, its role in shaping 
the present increases.  
Similarly, the information on the number of tests conducted for each region can be employed 
to estimate the relative safety (not to be confused with the safety perspective presented in 
Supplementary Fig. 5). The corresponding Cumulative Standardised Testability Ratio (CSTR) 
was calculated in an analogous procedure to that of the CSIR. If we denote 𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 as the 
cumulative number of tests conducted for region 𝑖 up to day 𝑡 − 1, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 as the number of tests 
conducted for 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and 𝑇𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡 as the cumulative expected number of tests for 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 
then the formula for CSTR can be written as follows: 
𝐶𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
=  
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖
∑ (𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡)𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
   (3) 
The interpolation procedure was conducted as follows. We first used interpolate_tests 
function to estimate the cumulative number of tests for individual days assuming a constant 
intercept: for example, if the cumulative number of tests for region 𝑖 were 1000 and 8000 on 
May 11 and May 18 respectively, then the intercept for every day related to this time window 
is equal to 
8000−1000
7
=
7000
7
= 1000. Then, to obtain the approximate value of CSTRs for 
individual days, relrisk function was used. We note that the assumption of constant intercept 
may not be realistic but we are not ready to commit to the idea of the best interpolation method 
in case of differences in temporal resolution between data on infections and testing. To avoid 
edge-effects that are inherent for the interpolation method, statistical approaches including best-
fitting curves could be employed. However, the main disadvantage of the statistical procedure 
is that one cannot expect that the official data of cumulative number of tests will be honoured 
at nodes. 
The interpolation enabled the weighted model to be obtained through the division of data frames 
corresponding to data on infections and testing. The corresponding equation of the resulting 
WCSIR is as follows: (𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠)/(𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠/
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠). 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
=  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖
∑ (𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡)𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖
∑ (𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡)𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
   (4) 
From a methodological viewpoint, we note that the curves presented here could also be viewed 
as a measure of relative safety in the form of 
1
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
. This safety perspective provides a 
better visualization of regions with lowest values of relative risk that in the CSIR or WCSIR 
models are difficult to distinguish (Supplementary Fig. 5). 
Local and global positivity ratios (LPR and GPR) 
Because the relationship between local and global dynamics of the cumulative proportion of 
positive cases exerts influence on the dynamics of WCSIR, we provide formulas for these 
measures: 
𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡
   (5),  𝐺𝑃𝑅(𝑡) =  
𝑂(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡)
  (6) 
The computational objectives corresponding to functions included in the computer code are 
summarised in Table 2. We used the following R packages: dplyr 54, ggplot2 55, 
ggpubr 56, reshape2 57, tibble 58, sf 59, tmap 60, broom 61, plotly 62 and 
magrittr 63. 
  
Mathematical formalism 
 
Theorem 1. For a specific region 𝑖, the 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅 on day 𝑡 will decrease if the proportion of new 
cases for this region on day 𝑡 will be not greater than the proportion of all cases for this region 
on day 𝑡 − 1. 
Proof.  
Let 𝑖 be a specific region and 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1) = 𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1/𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1) and 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = (𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡)/𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡  be the cumulative estimates of relative risks for region 𝑖 on days 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡, 
respectively, where 𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes the total (historical) sum of observed number of cases for 𝑖 
registered on day 𝑡 − 1, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 denotes new cases for 𝑖 confirmed on day 𝑡, and 𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1) and 𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡 
denote the expected cumulative number of cases for 𝑖 on days 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡, respectively. The 
decrease in 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅 between days 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 may be written in the form of an inequality: 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
≤
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
  ↔  (7) 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ≤
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
  ↔  (8) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ≤
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡
𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
−
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
=  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1(𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡−𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1))
𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
  ↔  (9) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡
≤
𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡−𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1)
 ↔   (10) 
But 𝐸𝑖,1:(𝑡−1) = 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡−1 and 𝐸𝑖,1:𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 with 𝑟𝑡−1 =
𝑂(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
 and 𝑟𝑡 =
𝑂(𝑡−1)+𝑥(𝑡)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
, where 𝑂(𝑡 −
1)  denotes the total (historical) sum of observed number of cases for all regions on day 𝑡 − 1, 
𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑖  denotes the sum of cases confirmed for all regions on day 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖 is the population 
size in 𝑖, and ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖  is the country-wide population. Thus,  
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤
𝑃𝑖(𝑟𝑡−𝑟𝑡−1)
𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡−1
=   
𝑟𝑡−𝑟𝑡−1
𝑟𝑡−1
   (11) 
Substituting for 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡−1: 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤
𝑂(𝑡−1)+𝑥(𝑡)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
− 
𝑂(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑂(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
=  
𝑥(𝑡)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑂(𝑡−1)
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
=
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
   (12) 
But the above result is equivalent to:  
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑥(𝑡) 
≤
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
   (13) 
Note that 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑥(𝑡) 
 is the proportion of cases for region 𝑖 on day t, while 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 is the “cumulative” 
proportion of cases for region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 − 1, i.e. the total (historical sum) of confirmed cases 
for 𝑖 up to day 𝑡 − 1, divided by the total (historical sum) of confirmed cases in the country up 
to day 𝑡 − 1. 
It is also possible to write a simplified version of the above proof. Let 𝑂(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑂𝑖,𝑡𝑖 , 𝑃 =
∑ 𝑃𝑖 𝑖 ,  𝜌𝑖 =
𝑃𝑖
𝑃
 and 𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑖 . Then  
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =
𝑂𝑖,𝑡 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
=  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡 
𝑃𝑖𝑂(𝑡)
𝑃
=
1
𝜌𝑖
 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑂(𝑡)
.    (14) 
Then, 
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ≥  𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)  ↔    (15) 
1
𝜌𝑖
 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
≥
1
𝜌𝑖
 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑂(𝑡)
 ↔   (16) 
 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
≥
𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑂(𝑡)
 ↔   (17) 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1𝑂(𝑡) ≥  𝑂𝑖,𝑡𝑂(𝑡 − 1)    (18) 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑂(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑥(𝑡)) ≥  (𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑡)𝑂(𝑡 − 1)    (19) 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1𝑥(𝑡) ≥  𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑂(𝑡 − 1)    (20) 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
≥
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑥(𝑡)
   (21) 
  
 Theorem 2. The WCSIR will decrease if either of the two following conditions in the form of 
conjuctions are met: 
(i) the proportion of infected for region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is not greater than the cumulative 
proportion of infected for region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 − 1 and the proportion of tests in region 
𝑖 on day 𝑡 is not smaller than the cumulative proportion of tests on day 𝑡 − 1. 
(ii) the ratio of positive cases for region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 is not greater than the cumulative 
ratio of positive cases on day 𝑡 − 1 and the ratio of positive cases for the whole 
country on day 𝑡 is not smaller than the cumulative ratio for the whole country of 
positive cases on day 𝑡 − 1. 
 
Let  𝑇(𝑡) denote the cumulative number of tests on day 𝑡. If either of the following conditions 
holds, 
 
(i) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑥(𝑡)
≤
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 and 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦(𝑡)
≥
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇(𝑡−1)
  (equivalently 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 and
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
≤
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) 
(22) 
or 
(ii) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
≤
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 and 
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡)
≥
𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
  (equivalently 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 and 
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
≤
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
) 
(23) 
 
Then, 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1) (24) 
  
Proof. 
 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) =
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
𝐶𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
=
𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝜌𝑖𝑂(𝑡)
𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝜌𝑖𝑇(𝑡)
=
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂(𝑡−1)+𝑥(𝑡)
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇(𝑡−1)+𝑦(𝑡)
   (25) 
We note that 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ↔ (26) 
 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑂(𝑡−1)+𝑥(𝑡)
∗  
𝑇(𝑡−1)+𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
≤  
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
∗  
𝑇(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 ↔  // ÷ 𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 and ∗ (𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡) (27) 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  
𝑇(𝑡−1)+𝑦(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)+𝑥(𝑡)
≤  
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  
𝑇(𝑡−1)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
  ↔ // ÷ 𝑇(𝑡 − 1) and ∗ (𝑂(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑥(𝑡)) (28) 
(1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
) ∗  
𝑇(𝑡−1)+𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
≤ (1 +
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) ∗  
𝑂(𝑡−1)+𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
  ↔  (29) 
(1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
) ∗ (1 +
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
) ≤ (1 +
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) ∗ (1 +
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
). (30) 
 
 
Assuming that condition (𝑖) holds, we get: 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 ↔ 1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤ 1 +
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
  (31) 
and 
(1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
) ∗ (1 +
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
) ≤ (1 +
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
) (1 +
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
) ≤  (1 +
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
) (1 +
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
)  (32) 
which is equivalent to 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1). (33) 
 
Assuming that condition (𝑖𝑖) holds, we get: 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 ↔ 1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
≤ 1 +
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 . (34) 
Thus, 
(1 +
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
) ∗ (1 +
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
) ≤ (1 +
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) (1 +
𝑦(𝑡)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
) ≤ (1 +
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) (1 +
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑂(𝑡−1)
)  (35) 
 
Which is equivalent to the following inequality: 
 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1) (36) 
 
Note that 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑥(𝑡)
 is the proportion of infected in region 𝑖 on day 𝑡, while 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 is the cumulative 
proportion of infected in region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 − 1; 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦(𝑡)
 is the proportion of tests in region 𝑖 on day 
𝑡, while 
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇(𝑡−1)
 is the cumulative proportion of tests in 𝑖 on day 𝑡 − 1. The value 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
 denotes the 
ratio of positive cases for region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 and 
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 is the cumulative ratio of positive cases 
for region 𝑖 on day 𝑡 − 1; 
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡)
 is the ratio of positive cases for the whole country on day 𝑡, while 
𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
 is the cumulative ratio of positive cases for the whole country on day 𝑡 − 1.  
 
  
Corollary 1. 
If 
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡) > 𝑊𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡 − 1)  (37) 
Then, 
(i) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑥(𝑡)
>
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 or 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦(𝑡)
<
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇(𝑡−1)
   (38) 
and 
(ii) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
>
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 or 
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡)
<
𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
   (39) 
This is equivalent to: 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑥(𝑡)
>
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
and 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
>
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 Or   (40) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦(𝑡)
<
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇(𝑡−1)
 and 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
>
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
 Or   (41) 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
𝑥(𝑡)
>
𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑂(𝑡−1)
 and 
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡)
<
𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
  Or   (42) 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦(𝑡)
<
𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇(𝑡−1)
 and 
𝑥(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡)
<
𝑂(𝑡−1)
𝑇(𝑡−1)
   (43) 
 
Proof. 
Using contraposition and applying de Morgan law to Theorem 2. 
 
  
 Fig. 1. The development of the epidemic in Poland throughout the study period: (A) Number 
of daily infections; (B) Cumulative number of infections. 
  
  
Fig. 2. Daily time series of (A) SIR and (B) CSIR by region in Poland. The gradient denotes 
the assumed decreasing intensity of screening tests with time. 
  
  
Fig. 3. Relative testing intensity throughout the study period. Please note that the data are 
interpolated which causes “edge” effects at the nodes. 
  
 
Fig. 4. WCSIR by region in Poland. Note that we included two unweighted CSIR curves 
(bolded) to illustrate the impact of weighting. The gradient denotes the assumed decreasing 
intensity of screening tests with time. 
  
  
Fig. 5. COVID-19 epidemiological measures for administrative regions in Poland. (CSIR – 
Cumulative Standardised Incidence Ratio, CSTR – Cumulative Standardised Testability Ratio, 
LPR – Local Positivity Rate, GPR – Global Positivity Rate, WCSIR – Weighted Cumulative 
Standardised Incidence Ratio). 
  
 
Fig. 6. Local (LPR) and global (GPR) cumulative positivity ratios. 
  
  
Fig. 7. Relationship between CSIR and WCSIR curves for individual regions representing six 
distinct patterns: (A) 1 WRO: Both CSIR and WCSIR values are decreasing, (B) 7 WAR: CSIR 
is decreasing and WCSIR is increasing, (C) 8 OPO: divergent pattern of CSIR and WCSIR, (D) 
9 RZE: both CSIR and WCSIR are increasing, (E) 12 KAT: proportional growth of CSIR and 
WCSIR, then the relationship plateaus, (F) 15 POZ: a change in trajectory followed by a zigzag 
pattern between CSIR and WCSIR. 
  
 
Fig. 8. Relationship between CSTR and CSIR: (A) 1 WRO: CSIR is monotonically decreasing 
even if the CSTR is sometimes increasing (B) 7 WAR: both CSTR and CSIR are decreasing up 
to early August, (C) 8 OPO: decreasing CSTR with a simultaneous growth in CSIR in late-
May, (D) 9 RZE: CSIR increasing since mid-June, yet CSTR increased in August, (E) 12 KAT: 
similar growth rate between CSTR and CSIR in early June that followed a greater growth rate 
of CSIR in May, (F) 15 POZ: decreasing CSTR with undulating CSIR. 
  
 
Fig. 9. Relationship between LPR and WCSIR: (A) 1 WRO: simultaneous decrease in LPR and 
WCSIR (B) 7 WAR: constant LPR with increasing WCSIR in mid-July, (C) 8 OPO: slightly 
decreasing LPR with an increasing WCSIR in late-May, (D) 9 RZE: both LPR and WCSIR are 
increasing since June, (E) 12 KAT: LPR and WCSIR are together increasing and then together 
decreasing, (F) 15 POZ: faster growth of WCSIR than that of LPR since July. 
  
Fig. 10. Relationship between CSIR and LPR: (A) 1 WRO: both CSIR and LPR are decreasing 
(B) 7 WAR: CSIR is decreasing and LPR is increasing, (C) 8 OPO: a zigzag trajectory, trend 
shows decreasing CSIR and LPR, (D) 9 RZE: both CSIR and LPR are increasing since mid-
June, (E) 12 KAT: constant CSIR with decreasing LPR in July, (F) 15 POZ: change in 
simultaneous decrease of both CSIR and LPR since July. 
  
Region CSIR Rank 1 Relative Change (%) WCSIR Rank 2 
1 WRO 0.85 7 -6.70 0.79 9 
2 BYD 0.33 15 +11.60 0.37 16 
3 LUB 0.40 12 +31.76 0.53 12 
4 GOR 0.39 13 +112.31 0.83 8 
5 LOD 1.27 2 -2.03 1.24 4 
6 KRA 1.09 3 -0.73 1.09 5 
7 WAR 0.99 4 -39.66 0.60 11 
8 OPO 0.98 5 +170.53 2.66 2 
9 RZE 0.59 10 +171.41 1.61 3 
10 BIA 0.65 8 +19.97 0.78 10 
11 GDA 0.47 11 -15.24 0.40 15 
12 KAT 2.80 1 +3.10 2.89 1 
13 KIE 0.64 9 +33.05 0.85 7 
14 OLS 0.30 16 +43.36 0.42 14 
15 POZ 0.91 6 -5.82 0.86 6 
16 SZC 0.39 14 +13.04 0.44 13 
 
Table 1. Estimates of relative risk (as of August 17) using unweighted (CSIR) and weighted 
(WCSIR) approaches, relative changes and their corresponding positions. 
  
 Function What does it do? 
cumulate_df A function that cumulates a data frame 
relrisk Calculates SIR. Note that it can also be used to provide input to 
interpolate_tests function.  
relrisk_cum Calculates CSIR. 
sum_cum Calculates cumulative sum of observed cases for every day. 
interpolate_tests Calculates CSTR. 
weighted_risk Calculates WCSIR. 
reorder It is used to properly assign risk CSIR and WCSIR values to the 
polygons in shapefile. 
 
Table 2. The description of functions included in the computer code (R script). 
  
Data availability: 
Processed data on infections and testing are available at  
https://github.com/michalmichalak997/COVID-19  (Data_and_code.zip). Original data on 
infections and testing are available at https://twitter.com/mz_gov_pl?lang=pl. Processed data 
that are used for generating individual plots are available at 
https://github.com/michalmichalak997/COVID-19  (Data_for_figures.zip). Population census 
data are available at https://stat.gov.pl/en/ .  
 
Code availability 
Computer code is available at  https://github.com/michalmichalak997/COVID-
19/blob/master/README.md. Interactive plots are publicly available at 
https://michalmichalak997.shinyapps.io/shiny_corona/ 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 Supplementary Figure 1. Administrative regions of Poland with full names and capitals (in 
parentheses): 1 WRO – dolnośląskie (Wrocław), 2 BYD – kujawsko-pomorskie (Bydgoszcz), 
3 LUB – lubelskie (Lublin), 4 GOR – lubuskie (Gorzów Wielkopolski), 5 LOD – łódzkie 
(Łódź), 6 KRA – małopolskie (Kraków), 7 WAR – mazowieckie (Warszawa), 8 OPO – 
opolskie (Opole), 9 RZE – podkarpackie (Rzeszów), 10 BIA – podlaskie (Białystok), 11 GDA 
– pomorskie (Gdańsk) , 12 KAT – śląskie (Katowice), 13 KIE – świętokrzyskie (Kielce), 14 
OLS – warmińsko-mazurskie (Olsztyn), 15 POZ – wielkopolskie (Poznań), 16 SZC – 
zachodniopomorskie (Szczecin). 
  
 Supplementary Figure 2. Relationship between CSTR and LPR: (A) 1 WRO: LPR is 
monotonically decreasing, CSTR is sometimes increasing (B) 7 WAR: CSTR is decreasing and 
LPR increasing since late-July, (C) 8 OPO: CSTR increasing since June with a constant LPR 
in August, (D) 9 RZE: CSTR increased slightly in August with dramatically increasing LPR, 
(E) 12 KAT: decreasing LPR and increasing CSTR since mid-June, (F) 15 POZ: faster decrease 
rate for CSTR than the rate of increase of LPR since July. 
 
  
 Supplementary Figure 3. Relationship between CSTR and WCSIR: (A) 1 WRO: WCSIR is 
monotonically decreasing, the CSTR is sometimes increasing (B) 7 WAR: CSTR decreasing 
with a trend of increasing WCSIR since late-May, (C) 8 OPO: decreasing CSTR with a 
simultaneous growth in WCSIR in mid-May, (D) 9 RZE: CSTR increased slightly in August 
with a dramatically increasing WCSIR, (E) 12 KAT: decreasing WCSIR since mid-June and 
increasing CSTR, (F) 15 POZ: decreasing CSTR with undulating WCSIR since July. 
  
 Supplementary Figure 4. Relationship between GPR and LPR: (A) 1 WRO: decreasing LPR 
with increasing GPR in early-June and August, (B) 7 WAR: in August both LPR and GPR are 
increasing, (C) 8 OPO: in August LPR approximately constant with increasing GPR, (D) 9 
RZE: in August LPR increasing faster than GPR, (E) 12 KAT: increasing LPR with decreasing 
GPR in May, (F) 15 POZ: in August GPR increasing faster than LPR. 
  
 Supplementary Figure 5. Relative safety perspective assumed as 1/risk: (A) unweighted safety 
(1/CSIR); (B) weighted safety (1/WCSIR).  
  
Supplementary Tables 
Error 
ID 
No. of 
errors 
Reporting date Error date Correction date Reference 
1 4 June 26, 2020 ND June 25, 2020 1 
2 5 June 26, 2020 ND June 24, 2020 2 
3 51 June 19, 2020 ND June 16-19, 2020 3 
4 1 June 2, 2020 ND June 1, 2020 4 
5 2 June 9, 2020 June 6, 2020 June 6, 2020 5 
6 4 May 31, 2020 ND May 31, 2020 6 
7 1 May 29, 2020 ND May 27, 2020 7 
8 2 May 26, 2020 ND May 26, 2020 8 
9 1 June 1, 2020 ND May 25, 2020 9 
10 34 May 25, 2020 ND May 25, 2020 10 
11 4 May 23, 2020 ND May 23, 2020 11 
12 2 May 25, 2020 ND May 23, 2020 12 
13 39 May 13, 2020 May 12, 2020 May 12, 2020 13 
14 21 May 8, 2020 May 7, 2020 May 7, 2020 14 
15 17 May 7, 2020 May 5, 2020 May 5, 2020 15 
16 2 May 6, 2020 ND May 5, 2020 16 
17 63 April 30, 2020 April 16 - 19, 2020 April 16 - 19, 2020 17 
18 5 June 2, 2020 ND June 1, 2020 18 
 
Supplementary Table 1.  Reported inaccuracies related to the number of confirmed cases. 
  
  
Region Cumulative number of tests 
(as of March 26, 2020) 
Source (OD – official 
data sent on request) 
1 WRO 2360 OD 
2 BYD 1112 OD 
3 LUB 2254 OD 
4 GOR 1953 OD 
5 LOD 3599 OD 
6 KRA 1803 OD 
7 WAR 7890 OD 
8 OPO 488 OD 
9 RZE 1591 19 
10 BIA 867 19 
11 GDA 1248 OD 
12 KAT 2672 OD 
13 KIE 1408 OD 
14 OLS 1758 OD 
15 POZ 1715 OD 
16 SZC 759 OD 
 
Supplementary Table 2. Cumulative number of tests, as of March 26, 2020. 
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